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It is tempting to see democratic politics today in terms of a contrast between technocracy and 
populism. One scholar has thus framed a distinction between ‘policy without politics’ and ‘politics 
without policy’ (Schmidt 2006), which echoes an early definition of ‘post-truth politics’ as ‘a 
political culture in which politics (public opinion and media narratives) have become almost 
entirely disconnected from policy (the substance of legislation)’ (Roberts 2010). This sort of politics 
simultaneously opens spaces for populist discourse uncoupled from ‘facts’ and for technocratic 
policy-making uncoupled from popular accountability. Nadia Urbinati thus highlights ‘the 
codevelopment of populism and epistemic ambitions in government, each fueling the other while 
both devaluing democratic procedures’ (Urbinati 2014, p. 84). Populism is a backlash to 
technocracy, and technocracy is a backlash to populism. Each justifies itself in terms of the threat it 
sees in the other. But both tend implicitly to reinforce the sense that knowledge is the province of 
experts and that a politics without due deference to experts is reduced to identity struggles with 
little meaningful epistemic content. 
The great value of Sophia Rosenfeld’s book, Democracy and Truth, is that she resists this framing 
of the tension, and instead tells a history of democracy through the tension between different claims 
to knowledge. She outlines a democratic epistemology, characterised by ‘a commitment to an 
undogmatic, open-ended conception of truth’ (Rosenfeld 2019, p. 26). Pluralism and scepticism, 
Rosenfeld contends, have been ‘a key characteristic of modern experiments with popular rule from 
the start’ (p. 27). From the period of the French Revolution and the American founding, she 
contends, democratic politics has turned around tensions between the undisciplined common 
knowledge or common sense of the people and the refined, systematised and eventually 
bureaucratised knowledge of various experts and elites. Furthermore, she suggests, they are both 
constitutive elements of democratic politics: what characterises democratic truth practices in their 
modern form is not any particular institution, but rather an idea of ‘rational disagreement, or 
agonism, leading to a kind of symbiosis between these different social bodies and their different but 
complementary ways of knowing’ (p. 29). Democratic politics involves two sorts of claims to 
knowledge, each of which is vital to the material, social and normative construction and 
maintenance of a democratic state and people. The question, then, is how to manage the tension 
between these two faces of democratic politics. How can they be set in a productive relationship? 
When and how do they risk pulling apart, and in the process undermining democratic politics 
altogether?  
In this Critical Exchange we take our cue from Rosenfeld’s historical exploration of the way 
technocracy and populism are intertwined, but seek to open up a new set of questions from the point 
of view of political theory, about the tension between popular and expert knowledge and the place 
of expertise in contemporary democratic politics. Our guiding question is: ‘what can political theory 
contribute to, and gain from, reflection on the relation between populist and technocratic tendencies 
in recent democratic politics?’ We begin with Carlo Invernizzi-Accetti, who addresses the overall 
architecture of Rosenfeld’s argument, and challenges the idea that we should frame democratic 
politics as a ‘regime of truth’. Instead of than regarding the technocratic and populist tendencies as 
part of an ongoing struggle that generates a distinctive democratic ‘regime of truth’, he frames 
democratic politics in terms of the ‘suspension’ of claims to truth. Because we recognise that we 
cannot persuade others of the substantive truth of our beliefs, we must all agree to set aside such 
claims in the interest of living together in peace. From this point of view, both populist and 
technocratic politics, by making claims to truth, violate the terms of this ‘suspension’ of truth in 
politics. We then turn to Elizabeth Markovits, who reflects on the ‘populist realism’ of our current 
political moment, and explains it in terms of a tension experienced by political subjects living in 
liberal democracies, between the abstract claims about popular sovereignty from which those 
regimes draw their legitimacy, and the practical experience of unfreedom. This leads to a search for 
who or what could be denying the people their freedom and gives a special appeal to those who 
symbolise a simple vision of sovereign power. The ‘populist realist’ – exemplified by Trump – is at 
the same time one who can see through opaque networks of power, yet who ironically demonstrates 
his control over the world by showing how little factual truth matters to him. Implicit in this view of 
populist realism is a sense that factual truth itself is false, an obfuscation of reality that arises from 
actors and institutions with specific interests, values and commitments.  
This mode of unmasking the politics behind claims to factual truth can be destructive, but 
Rosenfeld rightly emphasises the politics inherent in producing and advancing claims to factual 
truth in the political realm. The last two contributions to this exchange engage in particular with this 
theme (which is, in the literature on populism and technocracy cited above, given far less attention 
than the ‘populist’ part of the story). Alfred Moore draws on Hannah Arendt – a figure who 
provides a red thread running through Rosenfeld’s book – and in particular her discussion of 
‘factual truth’ in politics, in order to highlight the duality of expertise in politics. The dual quality of 
expertise, in his reading of Arendt, is that it is at the same time political and antipolitical: political in 
that it belongs to the realm of things established by communication and common action, but 
antipolitical in its ‘mode of asserting validity’. This explains some of the patterns of politicization 
of expert knowledge around issues such as climate change, but it also suggests the difficulties 
attached to the idea of seeking to keep the politics out of expertise. Moore highlights the role of 
transparency in making explicit the politics involved in the construction of expertise. Zeynep 
Pamuk further develops the contestatory dimension of Rosenfeld’s democratic epistemology. As 
Rosenfeld tells it, democratic politics has always been defined by struggles over what counts as 
knowledge, and whose knowledge counts. She frames this struggle in terms of two groups with 
‘competing and mutually exclusive claims to truth’, and raises the crucial question of how they 
relate to one another, and how such struggles might be organised. Pamuk takes this insight forward 
in creative ways by thinking through two ways in which we could resist the monopolistic tendencies 
of expert knowledge: one drawing on the role of common law juries, and the other drawing on 
social movements. She concludes with a warning about the role of money in knowledge production 
and how it can distort and undermine healthy competition, thus suggesting an important line of 
inquiry into the role of science funding in democratic politics. The exchange concludes with a 
response from Sophia Rosenfeld.  
Democracy Without Truth: Beyond Populism and Technocracy 
I offer here a critical appraisal of two key claims advanced by Sophia Rosenfeld in her provocative 
and compelling new book, Democracy and Truth. The first claim is that modern democracy can be 
understood as a 'regime of truth', in the sense that it amounts to a particular way of producing a 
'shared set of convictions or useful facts' that function as a 'platform for crafting government policy' 
and therefore 'binding us all together in a minimal way' (p. 29). The second claim is that the two 
wellsprings for producing political truths in democracy – which Rosenfeld calls, respectively the 
'wisdom of the people' and the 'wisdom of elites' – have recently grown at odds with one another, 
resulting in a split between 'populist' and 'technocratic' registers of truth, which threatens the health 
and stability of existing democratic regimes (pp. 28-29).  
The first claim is grounded on a historical analysis that portrays modern democracy as an 
offspring of the 'Age of Revolutions' and therefore sets it in opposition to the ancien régime. In the 
thought of many of the authors who helped lay the grounds for this historical transition, Rosenfeld 
points out, modern democracy was associated with a 'particular truth culture' (p. 22), which cast the 
ancien régime as relying primarily on religious superstition and political dissimulation. This, for 
her, established a conceptual link between modern democracy and 'a commitment to demonstrable 
evidence and accuracy (rather than secrecy, lies and error), and a premium on sincerity and candor 
(over hypocrisy and corruption)' (p. 24).  
The idea is certainly reassuring, inasmuch as it pits ‘us’ (modern democrats) on the side of 
'truth' and 'sincerity', while relegating ‘them’ (pre-modern anti-democrats) on the side of 'error' and 
'dissimulation'. However, it runs counter to a deep pattern in the history of western political thought 
that has consistently associated truth with authority, and therefore heteronomy, and skepticism – or 
indeed relativism – with freedom, and therefore democracy. The pattern is already visible, for 
instance, in Plato’s thought and works. The main defenders of democracy in his dialogues are all 
'sophists', who believe that 'man is the measure of all things' and therefore that there is ultimately no 
distinction between opinion (doxa) and truth (episteme). In contrast, Plato’s Socrates stands for the 
existence of a truth beyond the conflict of opinions, which is why he thinks it makes no sense to 
distribute political power equally among the members of the demos. His belief in truth underpins 
the idea that political power should be entrusted to 'philosophers', since they are most likely to 
know what political truth amounts to.  
The same pattern can also be discerned in the historical period Rosenfeld focuses on. 
Although she seems to accept the XVIII century philosophes’ characterization of the ancien régime 
as founded on 'superstitions' and ‘dissimulation’ (pp. 22-3), it is difficult to ignore that this political 
regime also made an extensive use of the category of 'truth' in its own self-justifications. Consider, 
for instance, the following passage from Joseph de Maistre’s tirade against the French Revolution in 
his 1797 pamphlet entitled Considerations on France:  
I am so convinced of the truths I defend that when I consider the general weakening 
of moral principles, the divergence of opinions, the shaking of spineless monarchies 
… it seems to me that all true philosophy must opt between two hypotheses: either a 
new religion is going to come into existence or Christianity will be rejuvenated in 
some extraordinary way. You must choose between these two suppositions according 
to the position you have taken on the truth of Christianity (De Maistre 1797, p. 45).  
Here, 'truth' is clearly put in the service of a defense of the ancien régime, rather than its 
critique. In contrast, one of the features de Maistre found most unsettling – and politically 
dangerous – in the thought of the ancien régime’s critics was precisely their philosophical 
skepticism, which in some cases took the form of a full-blown moral relativism. There is, for 
instance, a clear line of continuity running from Michel de Montaigne’s moral relativism and his 
defense of religious toleration, to Pierre Bayle’s and Voltaire’s criticisms of absolute monarchy and 
their defenses of religious toleration. Similarly, it can be argued that Thomas Hobbes’ critique of the 
classical idea of 'natural law' – in the context of which he argued that 'good and evil' are merely 
'names that signify our appetites and aversions’ (Hobbes 1996, p. 110) – laid the foundations for the 
emergence of the modern idea of 'popular sovereignty' in the thought of authors such as Jean-
Jacques Rousseau and Emmanuel de Sieyes. For, it is only once the political domain is unshackled 
from the requirement of compliance with a set of pre-existent normative 'truths', that the people can 
be legitimately allowed to rule themselves.  
In the 19th century, the conceptual connection between truth and heteronomy, on the one 
hand, and skepticism and freedom, on the other, was reaffirmed by the Catholic Church’s ‘Syllabus 
of Errors’ and its reactionary slogan 'authority, not majority’ (Pius IX 1861), as well as by Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s famous comment on the 'philosophical disposition' of Americans, in which he 
suggested that citizens of democratic countries are deeply 'cartesian', in the sense that they display 
an inclination to 'doubt' all the received and revealed truths that they cannot establish for themselves 
(Tocqueville 2010, p. 699). The point was then made explicit in the 20th century by authors such as 
Hans Kelsen (1929) – who argued that modern democracy can be understood as a form of 
institutionalized relativism – and Claude Lefort, who maintained that the transition from the ancien 
régime to modern democracy is underpinned by a 'dissolution of the markers of certainty', which 
has led to a 'disincorporation' of the domains of 'Truth', 'Power' and ‘Law' (Lefort 1988, pp. 19-20).  
From this perspective, democracy doesn’t appear as a 'regime of truth', but rather as a 
political system based on the assumption of the irreducibility of conflict between competing 
interests and values within society. Instead of aiming to produce a 'shared set of convictions and 
useful facts' that can 'bind us all together in a minimal way’ (p. 29), it is therefore best understood 
as a way of managing conflict and disagreement by giving all competing views and interests within 
society an equal opportunity to exercise political power, in a provisional and revisable way. The 
point was cogently advanced by Hans Kelsen in his 1929 treatise on The Essence and Value of 
Democracy when he wrote that:  
He who views absolute truth and absolute values as inaccessible to the human 
understanding must deem not only his own, but also the opinion of others at least as 
feasible … He can therefore justify the coercion that a social order inevitably 
requires in no other way than with the assent of at least the majority of those who are 
supposed to benefit from the coercive order. Furthermore, because the minority is 
not absolutely wrong, the coercive order must be constructed in such a way that the 
minority will not be rendered entirely without rights and itself can become the 
majority at any time (Kelsen 1929, pp. 103-104).  
Starting from this conception of democracy, one also reaches a very different diagnosis of 
the danger posed by 'populism' and 'technocracy' to contemporary democratic regimes, compared to 
the one implicit in Rosenfeld’s second claim. The fact that these political forms pit the 'wisdom of 
the people' against the 'wisdom of elites' doesn’t necessarily appear as a problem, because 
democratic institutions are designed to deal with conflict and disagreement. Instead, the problem 
posed by populism and technocracy is that they reintroduce an orientation towards 'truth' within the 
framework of a political regime that is based in its exclusion – or at least suspension – from the 
political domain.  
Populism identifies political 'truth' with a reified and monolithic conception of the 'popular 
will'; whereas technocracy is based on the assumption that 'experts' have access to a vision of 
political truth which is not available to ordinary people, in virtue of their specialized training and 
professional competence. As such, they are both opposed to the very idea of democracy as a 
political regime based on the 'regulated rivalry' between conflicting interests and opinions, in which 
collectively binding decisions are made – in an always provisional and revisable way – through the 
procedure of majority rule and in respecting of the rights of minorities.  
This is manifested most clearly by the analogous way in which populists and technocrats 
relate to their political opponents. Whereas democracy is based on the assumption of the legitimacy 
of disagreement and therefore opposition, both populists and technocrats treat their political 
opponents as ‘enemies’, either of the people as a whole, or of the interests of 'truth' itself. The 
reason is that if you start from the assumption that politics is about discovering and implementing 
some kind of context-transcending 'truth', disagreement and conflict can only appear as a sign of 
error – and it makes no sense to tolerate error.  
From this, in turn, it follows that democracy cannot be seen as occupying some kind of 
intermediary position between populism and technocracy, as Rosenfeld effectively suggests in her 
book. Above and beyond their different ways of construing and proposing to discover political 
'truth', populism and technocracy prove to be equally at odds with democracy itself. So, trying to 
find some kind of 'balance' between them is not going to result in a more democratic system overall, 
but rather in an irresolvable conflict between monolithic conceptions of political truth, which is 
bound to undercut the scope for political disagreement and reciprocal toleration.  
This emerges in the last chapter of Rosenfeld’s book, where she proposes some remedies for 
the growing split between populism and technocracy in contemporary democratic regimes. Relying 
on the assumption that the 'wisdom of the people' and the 'wisdom of elites' need to work 'in 
tandem' with one another, she proposes a distinctively technocratic set of measures for dealing with 
populism’s 'flooding tactics’ (p. 156). These basically boil down to a 'juridical restriction' of the 
allowable sphere of free speech, and an enhancement of the 'epistemic authority' of 'knowledge-
producing institutions'. In this respect, for instance, Rosenfeld writes that: 
The legal system – and faith in its processes to discover and punish forms of 
deception regardless of their place of origin – remains essential to enforcing the idea 
that striving for something called ‘the truth’ is, at once, an epistemological and an 
ethical obligation in our lives in common … Schools, colleges and universities, 
public and private, play an equally critical role in this business, even as we recognize 
them as often undemocratic and coercive spaces, [since] they provide us with a 
special opportunity to instill the epistemic-moral aspirations essential to fostering a 
truly democratic truth culture (p. 167). 
It may perhaps appear surprising that a book which begins by describing democracy as a 
way of producing a 'shared set of convictions or useful facts' to 'bind us all together in a minimal 
way’ (p. 29) ends up calling for forms of legal censorship and political indoctrination by institutions 
it explicitly describes as 'coercive' and 'undemocratic'. However, if the key argument I have sought 
to advance here is correct – namely, that truth functions politically as a justification of authority, 
whereas self-government is predicated on its exclusion from the political domain – it follows that 
any attempt to construe democracy as a 'regime of truth' is ultimately bound to contradict itself.  
Freedom does not lie at the point of intersection between two contradictory forms of 
heteronomy, but rather at the point at which politics is dis-anchored from truth.  
Carlo Invernizzi-Accetti 
Populist Realism, Truth, and Democratic Freedom 
Sophia Rosenfeld’s Democracy and Truth: A Short History is a deeply impressive work, offering a 
concise intellectual history of the complex relationship between democracy and truth. Deftly 
moving from the 18th century to the present, Rosenfeld clearly charts the ways in which democratic 
equality, authority and expertise, and empirical truth have mutually undergirded and undermined 
one another. Beginning with a depressing portrait of the 'post-truth' present in Western democracies, 
particularly in the United States, she then moves to fuller discussions of the twin pressures now 
threatening the very project of liberal democracy: the rise of technocracy and the rise of a 
pathological populism – interrelated, codependent phenomena. In the final sections, she examines 
the usual suspects receiving the blame for the contemporary manifestation of these tensions (post-
modern philosophy, Facebook, and so on), consistently returning to the structures, particularly 
financial and economic, that drive an enthusiasm for sensationalistic information and epistemic 
closure (the kind coming from social media and news bubbles, rather than the technical 
philosophical term). As I listen to Ambassador Yovanovitch testify in the impeachment hearings this 
morning – while President Trump attacks her on Twitter – it is difficult to quibble with the careful 
historical excavation or the often alarming implications of Rosenfeld’s study. I am both grateful for 
her work and slightly terrified.  
This tension between authority and equality is not new; it was a central concern in ancient Athens as 
well. The Athenian Assembly opened with a ritual question: who of the Athenians has advice to 
give? The ideal of isegoria gave each citizen an equal right to speak and offer useful advice to the 
demos as it deliberated; this invitation proclaimed the Athenian faith in the judgment of all citizens. 
The problem with a figure like Socrates, then, was that he came along and told people, often quite 
publicly, that they did not know what they were talking about, that they might be mistaken about the 
truth. Critics of his, like Aristophanes, skewered Socrates (and other leading public figures) for this 
elitism. In many of his comedies, for example, Aristophanes seems to be saying that the only way 
out of the troubles dogging his protagonist is to avoid intellectual innovation, the rhetorical tricks of 
politicians, and urban life more generally. That is, most people can do well enough on their own, 
providing they keep it simple and look to the past as an example of life well-lived. The mythos 
around the simple man focused on his ability to sensibly guide the polis through difficult moments 
because he did not overthink things and saw them instead as they really were – and not as goofballs 
like Socrates in his Thinkery would fool you with words into believing, despite your own good 
sense. This is one reason speakers in Athens – including Socrates in Plato’s telling – constantly and 
unbelievably claim to have no skill in public speaking. They – like Trump and so many other near 
contemporaries as Rosenfeld details – are just telling it like it is.  
So as I applaud Rosenfeld’s careful excavation of the contemporary crisis, I also want to draw 
attention to the fact that the tension between equality and truth (however conceived) is perhaps 
inherent to democratic forms themselves, and to how that is revealed by the remarkably consistent 
recourse to what I’ve elsewhere described as a hypersincerity, which relies on a realist rhetorical 
tone. At the same time, the tension takes on very different shades in different contexts, for sure – 
and Rosenfeld’s brief volume does so much to elucidate the specific developments of the last few 
hundred years. The current flavor of realist rhetoric circulating today is a particularly populist one. 
As Rosenfeld describes it, this populism trades on the 'exaltation of the real people, the 
unjustifiably powerless' who have 'been betrayed by the very individuals in whom they had put their 
trust' (pp. 99, 100). The conspiracy theories and xenophobia of the current moment mark it as 
critically different from other realist rhetorical styles and distinctly populist – although the ways in 
which the realist style often invokes the real as simple, unadorned, and commonsensical make this 
link seem inevitable.  
The basic pitch goes like this: like other realist rhetoricians before, the populist realist claims to be 
The One who can see the world clearly, unafraid of confronting the Politically Correct or the 
Beltway insiders. There are certain brutal realities out there, known to The One because of the time 
he has spent living in the 'real world.' Much of this is standard realist rhetorical fare. The populist 
inflection comes along in the promised return to a past in which The People had power, before the 
overeducated outsiders wrested power, status, and wealth from them. And so in the US, we have a 
member of the New York elite posing as the only hope for real Americans left behind by 
technocratic globalism. This is clear in the ways in which Trump has explained away his elite status 
– he knows how the 1% plays the game. An old party pic with the Clintons is just more proof that 
he’s the man the people need – an insider willing to work for them. Trump’s hypersincerity and 
plain speech signaling (grammatical errors as proof that he is either too busy solving real problems 
or else just one of the people) are nothing new. But it is amalgamated with a pathological populism 
– with common sense and unfiltered vision, the populist realist leader promises a return to a 
glorious past, when life was more simple and the people were in control of their lives.  
It is this yearning for their own sovereignty – control over their lives – that makes the 'post-truth' 
populist realist so irresistible to many. As Rosenfeld points out, economic systems and financial 
structures lie at the root here, although I want to propose a different mechanism than the ones 
Rosenfeld examines (like the rise of market-driven social media). Instead, I want to think about 
what Sheldon Wolin termed 'inverted totalitarianism’ – illiberal, managed democracy where 
corporate and state power work together to shore up elite economic control. Inverted totalitarianism 
is the political form of neoliberal economics – state and economic power linked for its own benefit, 
meant to manage the demos’s potential unruliness. Coupled with state power, this form all the while 
continues to trumpet 'popular sovereignty' as the source of its legitimacy, but which now is limited 
to periodic and outrageously expensive elections. This leaves us with a 'devitalized agency,' in Ali 
Aslam’s (2017, p. 2) words, a bewildering loss of freedom in an era animated by a passion for 
freedom. My hunch is that the desire for freedom of those living in an era of inverted totalitarianism 
gets displaced elsewhere – onto the figure of Trump. Political subjects living in liberal democracies, 
states that claim their legitimacy through popular sovereignty, are increasingly frustrated by the 
practical experience of their unfreedom. Having no obvious recourse – that is, these global forces 
seem too massive and unbounded to really tackle – many political subjects see Trump as their 
champion. He has sovereign power – he can command and control the world, in part because he can 
see it so clearly. And, ironically, in this case, controlling the world means demonstrating to all of us 
how little factual truth matters to him in the end. He can reshape it – he makes the claims he wants, 
without regard for an outside empirical reality. What kind of power is more self-made, more 
unbounded than being able to do that with impunity? The sovereign is absolute, has no rule above 
him. In this version, not even facts provide that rule or higher authority. And so populist realists in 
an era of inverted totalitarianism will find an easy sport mocking expertise and truth not simply 
because democratic equality can lie in tension with other forms of authority – as it has since Athens 
– but because the failure to realize more meaningful forms of democracy leave the people ripe for 
the truth-bashing pandering demagogue.  
Realism – which has so many different and seemingly contradictory manifestations – generally 
relies on a claim to really see the world, to remain grounded in reality, as opposed to fantastic or 
abstract ideals. Yet the most fascinating thing about the version of populist realism that Rosenfeld 
so expertly chronicles is how it becomes a claim to a sort of sovereign power that undermines the 
factual reality that purports to ground the realist. In this way, populist realism is, hopefully and 
happily, necessarily tragic. That, it cannot last because the hubris of this position always leads to 
overreach and self-destruction. The question is how much of the social fabric weaving us together 
into political community is destroyed in the process.  
Elizabeth Markovits 
Dealing with the Duality of Expertise 
‘Without common belief’, Tocqueville wrote at the beginning of volume two of Democracy in 
America, ‘no society can exist’. By common belief he meant belief taken ‘on trust and without 
discussion’ (Tocqueville 1990, 8). Shared beliefs, on this view, are constitutive of social order; and 
where such shared beliefs cease to exist, social order itself will disintegrate. The sorts of shared 
beliefs he had in mind were rooted in tradition and religion, but his point was a general one: no 
social body – if it is to be a social body at all – can do without some unreflective background of 
shared belief. Of course, it is almost axiomatic of pluralistic liberal democracies that we do not 
share beliefs about religion or what Rawls (1993, xvi) called ‘comprehensive doctrines’. But 
something of Tocqueville’s intuition is firmly present in liberal anxieties about the fate of truth in 
democratic politics. Historian Daniel Rodgers (2017), for instance, commenting on ‘post-truth’ 
politics, worries that ‘where truths are utterly free to be individually chosen, where the processes of 
inquiry are marginalized, the social disintegrates.’ Thus it is often thought that democracy 
presupposes some minimal agreement about what reality looks like, and that this minimum is given 
by – in Rawls’s phrase – ‘common sense and the existing scientific consensus’ (Rawls 1999 [1971], 
480). 
This distinctive twist on the Tocquevillean theme – that we can and should disagree on all sorts of 
matters of profound existential importance, but not on simple matters of fact – was expressed with 
characteristic subtlety by Hannah Arendt. ‘Factual truth’, as she described it in Truth and Politics, is 
‘the ground on which we stand and the sky that stretches above us' (Arendt 2006, p. 259). By 
‘factual truth’ Arendt primarily had in mind ‘brutally elementary’ historical facts, concerning 
‘events and circumstances in which many are involved’, ‘established by witnesses and depend[ing] 
upon testimony’ (p. 234). Such factual truths are at once coercive and strangely fragile. They are 
coercive in the sense that it is not a matter of choice whether global warming exists or Germany 
started the first world war (to take Arendt’s example). ‘[T]hose things which men cannot change at 
will’ thus set a limit to political life (p. 259). Historical truths and scientific truths might be arrived 
at in different ways, but 'once perceived as true and pronounced to be so, they have in common that 
they are beyond agreement, dispute, opinion, or consent’ (p.235). ‘All truths... are opposed to 
opinion in their mode of asserting validity'. Thus, from the point of view of politics, 'truth has a 
despotic character' (pp. 235-6). 
Yet factual truths are produced and maintained by many hands in the common world, and thus 
‘belong to the same realm’ as opinion (p. 234). This duality – that factual truth is at once ‘political 
by nature’ (p. 234) and ‘beyond agreement, dispute, opinion, or consent’ (p. 235) – captures 
something important about our current politics of expertise. Because once the status of factual truth 
places a claim beyond dispute, that status becomes a valuable political commodity. There is great 
power in presenting expert claims as though they did not involve human decisions, negotiations, 
disputes or disagreements. The claim that there is an ‘expert consensus’ on a given issue – from 
climate change (see Moore 2017, pp. 118-146) to the benefits of global trade (see Rodrik 2015, p. 
65) – is meant to close debate on some questions and shift the debate to others. But it is for 
precisely this reason that factual truth is also peculiarly fragile. By taking the shape of claims that 
are beyond dispute, opinion or consent, factual truths become sites of intense struggle. They are at 
once coercive and fragile.  
When Arendt writes that ‘factual truth’ is ‘political by nature’, she means in part that it is liable to 
be politicised. Thus, as she puts it, the ‘statesman may be tempted to appeal to truth’ (Arendt 2006, 
p. 242). Yet one of the most valuable aspects of Rosenfeld’s Democracy and Truth is her sensitivity 
to a deeper sense in which factual truth is political. While Arendt’s truths are – in her revealing 
language – ‘perceived’ and ‘pronounced’ (p. 235), Rosenfeld emphasises how they are constructed 
and produced. As Rosenfeld points out, ‘factual truth’ is always produced by people with specific 
social positions, histories, interests, values and ideals. Thus she points out that alongside the 
abstract ideals of the enlightenment there grew up ‘new class lines… around the determination and 
expression of truth’ (Rosenfeld 2019, p. 49) and ‘new forms of “natural” social distinction’, 
including a persistent strand of intellectual meritocracy that ‘has never been separable from money 
and property, education, and social standing, [and] which has thus traditionally involved 
assumptions about gender, race, ethnicity, and religious identity too’ (pp. 49-50). Intellectual 
meritocracy has taken different forms, most powerfully through the nineteenth and twentieth 
century in tandem with the growth of government and the regulation of an ever widening sphere of 
social and economic activities, but Rosenfeld always keeps in view the ways in which the 
production of various sorts of factual claims were tied up with interpretations and thus with politics 
(p. 72). 
This heightened recognition of the political character of claims to expert knowledge raises (related) 
theoretical and practical problems. The theoretical problem has to do with the concept of expert 
authority invoked by Tocqueville and Arendt. If we cannot have expert authority as a source of 
common belief taken ‘on trust and without discussion’, then can we have it at all? Can we imagine a 
sort expert authority that is not anti-political in its ‘mode of asserting validity’? And if so, how can 
expert authority be constructed and communicated in a way that goes with the grain of a society 
with increasingly well-developed capacities to contest and challenge expert judgments? The 
practical problem is rooted in precisely those capacities of ordinary citizens to question and contest 
claims to expert knowledge, capacities which have been enhanced considerably over the last half 
century, due to factors including the expansion of higher education, changing forms of 
communication and association, and the rise of freedom of information laws through which (among 
other things) expert deliberations have been forced into the public domain. It is worth noting, for 
instance, that the ‘climate-gate’ controversy was prompted in part by a long series of freedom of 
information requests made by denialists looking for opportunities to discredit the expert consensus 
on climate change, and that among the more incriminating emails that were revealed to the public 
were those showing scientists trying to resist those FOI requests. In an echo of the more general 
dynamic of mutual backlash that Rosenfeld finds between populism and technocracy, the suspicion 
of the denialists prompted responses from the scientists that seemed to confirm some of those 
suspicions. 
In this context, it seems hard to fall back (as Arendt did) on norms of impartiality and institutional 
separation as a way of keeping ‘factual truth’ functional for politics without either dominating it or 
being corrupted by it. Rather than thinking of ways of keeping politics out of expertise, we should 
think of ways of organising politics into expertise. The challenge, then, is to find ways to conduct a 
sort of politics of expertise that makes its politics more explicit. This means, in particular, that 
expert authority cannot simply be asserted in the manner described by Arendt (and Tocqueville) as 
‘beyond agreement, dispute, opinion, or consent’ (Arendt 2006, p. 235). It must be organised into 
political processes of disagreement, dispute and so on. One general move is to make explicit the 
ways in which collective judgments are formed, and to more clearly articulate not just the 
uncertainties, but also the values and disagreements that were part of those judgments. To take one 
very concrete example, experts could make visible the differences in their judgments by holding 
votes on particular questions. Such a practice of voting on expert committees was studied in the 
context of medicines evaluation in the USA, and it revealed some fascinating differences between 
different disciplines with regard to judgments of risk (Guston 2005). But most importantly, it 
announces that expert authority does not have to take the form of claims that are simply ‘perceived’ 
and ‘pronounced’ to be true (in Arendt’s language), but that expert judgments can take the form of 
discussions and decisions that admit of degrees of disagreement as well as agreement, and which 
seek to make explicit the ways in which values and interests might feed into those disagreements. 
Thus, one way of supporting healthier interaction and engagement between popular and expert 
knowledge, or at least of resisting the sort of mutual backlash described above, is to develop ways 
of making value dimensions in expert judgments legible and explicit. 
But we should not be deceived about the depth of the problems that the current fears about 
democracy and truth have revealed. As Tocqueville suggests, what is at stake in this discussion – 
and Rosenfeld is right to emphasise it – is not a narrow question of deference to experts on this or 
that particular issue, however important that issue might be (from vaccine safety to climate change), 
but rather of constituting the social order. We should not fall into the trap of thinking that if only we 
could agree on some common set of facts then we could proceed to have reasonable disagreements 
about what we as a community ought to do. It is tempting to think – like Rodgers above – that 
society is falling apart because we no longer believe the same things. But it might be the other way 
round: perhaps we no longer believe the same things because society is falling apart. To the extent 
that this is the case, solutions will not come from the better organization and communication of 
knowledge, whether popular or expert, nor from institutions and practices of competition and 
interaction between them, but from the generation of substantive relations of common interest and 
mutual commitment. Nonetheless, we might at least begin – following Rosenfeld – with a more 
subtle and productive sense of what is going on in the very real conflict between ‘populist’ and 
‘technocratic’ tendencies in our politics.  
Alfred Moore 
The People vs. the Experts: A Productive Struggle? 
From the authors of the Federalist Papers to John Dewey and contemporary deliberative 
democrats, many theorists of democracy have subscribed to the same ideal for how truth should be 
handled in a democracy. At the core of this ideal is an epistemological division of labor between 
ordinary people and experts. Democratic decisions ultimately depend on the judgments of ordinary 
people, but since ordinary people do not possess the high-quality information required to make 
good judgments, they must turn to experts. Experts provide the information that can improve public 
deliberation and correct mistakes. Ordinary people use this information to make better judgments 
and then turn once again to experts, who are tasked with devising the means to implement chosen 
ends. This process is supported by a set of background epistemic norms and institutions, including 
plain (anti-rhetorical) speech, free speech, and norms of honesty, trust, and cooperation.  
The problem with this ideal, according to historian Sophia Rosenfeld, is that it has never 
been realized in anything remotely close to this form. Instead, the history of democracy has been a 
constant struggle between rule by expert truths and rule by majority instinct. As each group has 
tried to assert its exclusive claim to determining what counts as truth, the damage has been to 
democracy itself. Rosenfeld’s attention to the struggle between ordinary people and experts 
forcefully reveals what was wrong with the original ideal: It failed to account for struggle, and 
therefore, for politics. It was essentially an ideal of collective rational inquiry. Once we accept this 
critique, the question we must ask is whether it is possible to envision a different ideal for truth and 
expertise in democracy – one that avoids the naiveté of the original without devolving into the 
dangerous extremes of technocracy or populism. My goal in this essay is to answer this question in 
the affirmative and sketch the outlines of such an ideal. 
The building blocks of Rosenfeld’s account – two groups with competing and mutually 
exclusive claims to the truth – can provide the starting point for a solution. The challenge is to find 
ways to make the inevitable political struggle over truth a productive one. While the original ideal 
intended to wish away the struggle, technocracy and populism both declare a single winner who 
wants to end the competition. What democracies need instead is an ongoing and well-organized 
competition between these two forces. Ordinary people can act as a check on expert rule and 
improve expert knowledge by confronting it with their own claims to knowledge. The main danger 
to democracy is not this struggle itself, but the possibility of an end to the struggle, first through the 
formation of an expert monopoly in knowledge, and secondly through the populist backlash that 
inevitably follows. One way to reduce the danger of an expert monopoly is to ensure more 
competition among experts, so that 'the experts' don’t speak in a single authoritative voice that 
drowns out others. This must be complemented by a healthy dose of skepticism and mistrust on the 
part of ordinary people so that competing expert claims are scrutinized and contested, rather than 
taken on authority. This attitude of skepticism is distinct from the attitude of denial that is prevalent 
nowadays. While the former continues the engagement over truth claims, the latter is a refusal to 
engage. Formal institutions designed to organize competition and harness skepticism would be 
instrumental for realizing this ideal, but extra-institutional politics can often produce the same 
effects.  
Let me illustrate what I have in mind with two existing political organizations that 
exemplify this logic and successfully deal with competing truth claims from experts and ordinary 
people: the first are common law juries, the second are social movements. The jury trial is 
essentially a structured competition: there are two sides by design and each produces its own 
experts. The jury must judge the facts of the case and brings its own experiential knowledge to the 
task. This set-up combines the belief that experts possess valuable and relevant knowledge with the 
admission that the knowledge of any particular expert can be flawed and must be publicly 
examined. It also embodies the fundamentally democratic idea that the ultimate judgment lies with 
ordinary citizens. A particularly fascinating jury for our purposes is the coroner’s jury from 
nineteenth and early-twentieth century England, whose task was to rule on the cause of death in 
suspicious or violent cases. The jury would examine the body, hear testimony from an increasingly 
professionalized and sophisticated cadre of medical experts and freely interject in the proceedings 
with questions and comments. What made the coroner’s jury successful was its ability to legitimate 
the knowledge and status of experts, even while remaining a 'people’s court' where ordinary citizens 
retained significant power to check and contest expert knowledge claims (Burney 2000).  
The recent popular and academic interest in small-scale democratic experiments, such as 
citizen juries and consensus conferences, shows the promise of giving a more directly political 
(rather than purely judicial) role for juries. But these experiments get one thing wrong: Most 
existing designs involve citizens listening to experts and then deliberating amongst themselves (or 
with the experts) in light of the expert views provided. This epitomizes the logic of the ideal we 
started out with – that experts and ordinary people have different roles to play vis-à-vis truth claims 
within a deliberative system. What I propose instead is to experiment with something closer to a 
real jury by structuring these institutions adversarially. Competing experts should make their case 
and cross-examine one another, and the jury should have the final say on which truth claims should 
form the basis of the policy under consideration.  
Another political organization that embodies the ideal of contestation between the truth 
claims of experts and ordinary people are social movements (Moore 2017). Activists have often 
successfully confronted experts and forced them to change or revise their views to align the 
knowledge base of democratic policies more closely with the interests and knowledge of ordinary 
people. While some movements have indeed been built on a rejection of the scientific way of 
knowing and thus would count among examples of populist backlash, many others have started 
from a distrust of experts but have still engaged with experts on the terrain of scientific truth. These 
latter movements are the interesting ones from our perspective because they resist expert rule 
without rejecting the value of expert knowledge wholesale. A history of the democratic struggles 
over truth cannot be complete without attention to how social movements have wrangled with 
experts over the definition of truth at many crucial junctures. 
I will mention two examples. The first is the AIDS movement, where activists famously 
succeeded in confronting experts on matters of scientific truth and methodology (Epstein 1996). 
AIDS activists fought for the power to make their own truth claims heard by scientists, frequently 
capitalizing on existing fault lines between rival experts. In doing so, they broke the monopoly of 
experts over decisions about policies and research priorities. And they did so without making 
exclusive claims to knowledge themselves, or denying the relevance of medical expertise to their 
case. The second example is the women’s health movement, which empowered women from the 
1970s on to take control of their own bodies by demanding more and different medical choices on 
issues ranging from childbirth to abortion to breast cancer treatments (Kline 2010). Feminists 
successfully challenged a male-dominated medical establishment’s monopolization of knowledge 
about women’s bodies, but without rejecting the necessity of mainstream medicine for women’s 
health. Neither of these movements can be classified as examples of the collaborative Deweyan 
ideal because they involved adversarial forms of action that stemmed from deep mistrust of 
established experts. They are thus better described as illustrations of the alternative ideal I have 
sketched, which views struggle as instrumental for democratically and epistemically valuable 
outcomes.  
I singled out one institutional and one-extra institutional political organization in order to 
show that the kind of productive competition I have identified as an alternative can be realized at 
different political spaces and at different distances from established channels of power. Neither 
juries nor social movements always work perfectly, but we know that they can work and that they 
are good for democracy and for truth when they do.  
Before I conclude, I want to highlight what I think is a major obstacle to the realization of 
this model. Unsurprisingly, this ideal will be thwarted most by forces that increase the tendency of 
some experts to monopolize knowledge, shutting off avenues for contestation and competition, 
whether from other experts or from ordinary people. The increasing role of money in the production 
of expertise clearly has this effect. The almost complete dependence of expert knowledge on 
funding means that those who do not have funding are either driven out from the production of 
knowledge or incentivized to work under the dominant, highly-funded paradigms. Those who 
control the distribution of funding thus effectively control the knowledge that becomes politically 
salient (Pamuk 2018). These people also have strong incentives to protect their paradigms against 
challenges. This builds on a Kuhnian picture of science, but with money factored in.  
Rosenfeld also touches on this problem and points out that the increasing partnership 
between universities and industry means that the gap between public funding and public needs is 
increasing. This point cannot be emphasized enough; not only does this shut out ordinary citizens 
and social movements from the determination of research priorities, but it also unfairly skews the 
resulting public struggle over truth since potentially valuable dissenting views cannot be developed 
due to a lack of funding. Funding bodies are thus one of the insufficiently discussed but crucial 
institutions that shape the democratic struggle over truth. Laws protecting freedom of speech and 
inquiry are not enough in societies where some experts enjoy large amounts of funding. To make a 
productive democratic competition over truth possible, it is necessary to rethink the distribution of 
money for research and devise rules that will serve as the equivalent of antitrust for funding 
research: to promote broader competition over the truth for the public interest.  
Zeynep Pamuk 
Response 
This forum represents just what I had hoped for Democracy and Truth: A Short History (2019), 
namely that, as history of how we got to this moment, it would inspire new ideas on the part of 
savvy theorists of political language and practice. I found myself nodding in agreement, albeit with 
a few provisos that I outline below, with most of these suggestions for avenues worth pursuing in 
the future. Let me say a word about each in turn. 
Elizabeth Markovits, after a cogent summary of Democracy and Truth’s main points, rightly notes 
that the central tension in modern democracy, here redefined as one between equality and truth, is 
nothing new. It is inherent in democratic forms from the start – meaning since antiquity – and 
manifests itself repeatedly in a baldly realist rhetorical mode that she calls 'hypersincerity.' But 
Markovits also argues that the 'inverted totalitarianism' (in Sheldon Wolin’s terms) produced by a 
neoliberal political order has given this rhetoric a peculiar and distinctive populist inflection at 
present because 'the failure to realize more meaningful forms of democracy leaves the people ripe 
for the truth-bashing of a pandering demagogue.' (this Critical Exchange) Who could disagree 
(though I would add the failure to realize more meaningful forms of economic empowerment too)? 
Then, however, Markovits goes farther with the claim that, because this rhetoric is built on a 
contradiction – populist realism necessarily undermines the factual reality that it purports to expand 
– it cannot last. And that, to a historian, is a slightly odd argument, one that might need to be 
demonstrated on an empirical level to be convincing. Last in what sense? Or, how long counts as 
‘lasting’? Nothing in politics is eternal after all, and all systems or modes eventually collapse, 
sometimes from the weight of their contradictions, but just as often because of other factors entirely. 
Markovits’s final claim does, though, prompt some new, present-minded questions on my part: Why 
do such epistemic contradictions currently seem to be unproblematic even to those who recognize 
their existence, as in the legions of voters who, surveys show, accept that President Donald Trump 
lies and cheats but do not seem to care? Should we assume that increased public exposure to these 
contradictions – i.e. the message to the effect that you think he is more real than other politicians, 
but he is actually detaching you from reality, or you think he is speaking for you, but he is really 
speaking only for the 1% or even himself – is where this kind of politics becomes vulnerable? Or 
might this be a hopeless strategy for breaking the Trumpian spell of this moment?  
Alfred Moore might side with the second of these possibilities. Moore endorses Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s conviction that a social body needs some basic shared beliefs. He also endorses John 
Rawls’ position that, in a democracy, these are not going to be comprehensive doctrines, though an 
investment in truth and in how to get there (hint: it involves both science and common sense) might 
count as one of these low-level shared beliefs or, indeed, a basic truth by itself. Moore, though, sees 
a certain irony here, as do I and as did Hannah Arendt before both of us. For precisely because what 
Arendt called 'factual truth' has an exalted status in democracies, it always ends up generating new 
conflicts in practice about how it should be employed once it is established and, even more, about 
how it was produced in the first place. According to Moore, that leaves those of us interested in this 
predicament with an important task: to look for ways to make expertise more honest. That is, he 
calls on all of us to highlight rather than disguise the politics–the debates, the value judgments, even 
the fights–that are part of the process of crafting our shared truth claims. Yet, he also signals that 
such efforts may well be insufficient. As he puts it, 'It is tempting to think … that society is falling 
apart because we no longer believe the same things. But it might be the other way around. Perhaps 
we no longer believe the same things because society is falling apart.' (this Critical Exchange) 
Which may well be right. But this perspective also suggests that any effort to target specifically the 
epistemic problem before us – as Markovits implies is necessary – is bound to fail. Society has to be 
reconstituted first. But how, without any truth claims to ground it, might this be done? Here, Moore 
is perhaps suggesting, as I do in the final chapter of Democracy and Truth, that the problem would 
have to be tackled on multiple levels simultaneously. Any meaningful improvement would require 
re-establishing some baseline factual truths through vigilant fact-checking, bulking up institutions 
committed to methods for arriving at truth while also letting students and others see the messy 
business of how the sausage is made, and, most idealistically, investing in new forms of equality 
that leave us less vulnerable to the ravages of late capitalism. But I am actually not convinced even 
by the practical 'solutions' that I articulate in my book, and Moore offers more of a theoretical 
approach and an important caveat – rather than anything concrete – leaving real innovation on this 
front to others. 
This is where Zeynep Pamuk is especially helpful. Pamuk accepts that a longstanding tension 
between technocrats and populists, as well as between expertise and common sense, is the end 
product of our modern, Enlightenment-inspired political configuration. But then she poses the 
64,000-dollar-question: Can we actually do better than Enlightenment theorists or than the essential 
later democratic theorist John Dewey in thinking up ways to stave off the twin threats of 
technocracy and populism? Here Pamuk gets concrete – and inspiring too. Like Moore, Pamuk is a 
fan of open competition among ideas and their exponents as the precursor to any decision made in a 
democracy: common law juries are a key example for her. She also draws our attention to social 
movements that successfully apply skepticism to expert opinion without denying the importance of 
expertise itself – AIDS activists and women’s health advocates have in recent years, she points out, 
illustrated that this is an approach with legs. But it might be worth noting that Pamuk’s examples, 
like those of the other authors in this forum, are almost entirely drawn from conflicts around 
scientific truth, from climate change to public health disputes. One wonders about the possibility of 
social movements that approach with skepticism the 'factual truths' of our shared but often equally 
contested history – like who invaded Belgium at the start of WWI and when and why – that Arendt 
(and Moore) say are especially important to political life. Pamuk also draws our attention to the 
extremely important role of big money in shaping what counts as expertise in the first place, a 
problem everywhere, but one that is especially acute in the United States, where so much 
knowledge production and dissemination depends on private funds. Other obstacles to the success 
of social movements of the type that Pamuk describes come to mind as well. In an illiberal moment, 
illiberal institutions might make protest or adversarial politics difficult to orchestrate or even 
treacherous, especially as illiberal courts find ways to constrain counter-hegemonic movements. 
Popular exhaustion or growing apathy or loss of confidence in democracy in the first place could 
stymie such initiatives too. Or bastardized forms of democracy, like elections conducted with severe 
voting restrictions or unrepresentative forms of representation (the US Senate itself comes to mind) 
could do the same. Still, Pamuk gets us thinking about more than resistance by shifting the question 
to how to break the political/epistemic cycle in which we are caught in the first place. 
Carlo Invernizzi-Accetti stands out as the group’s pessimist or true cynic. His intriguing argument is 
that we would be better off giving up caring about truth in the first place as it does not, and should 
not, have much, if any, place in democratic political life. To make this argument seem novel, he 
rather distorts the content of my own. I never, of course, claim that all truths matter to democracy 
(they don’t: as I say, only very specific and minimal kinds do) or that the Enlightenment got it right 
about the old regime or anything else (historians like me describe ideas for their influence, but don’t 
take their job to be making claims about their actual validity). I also find it a stretch to relabel my 
plea for teaching children both methods of arriving at truths and healthy skepticism about all 
existing claims as an argument for 'political indoctrination' or to characterize my call for holding 
media companies responsible when they allow falsehoods to circulate that lead to physical harm as 
a defense of 'legal censorship,' especially since there is no society anywhere without extensive laws 
regarding speech. But that does not mean that there isn’t an interesting idea here in Invernizi-
Accett’s essay – and actually one I think we share: that both in practice and in theory, truth is bound 
always to be a problematic intrusion into any democracy. That is, of course, precisely why big 
truths, like the nature of God, have in democracies generally been taken off the table as impossible, 
indeed wrong, to adjudicate in the political sphere. It is also why claims for exclusive or absolute 
truth in either the populist or technocratic mode are perpetual threats. Skepticism is indeed intrinsic 
to democracy. So is pluralism.  
But must we throw the baby out with the bath water? Does Invernizzi-Accetti really want to get all 
truth out of politics? For I cannot help but wonder if he thinks we can really maintain any kind of 
effective democratic or even quasi-democratic political system without some low-level, general, and 
contingent consensus about what causes what, what is broadly desirable, what is dangerous, and, 
especially how to characterize what has already happened (Arendt’s factual truths, once again). If 
we cannot at least agree for the moment that there is substantial evidence that the planet is getting 
warmer and that it is doing so as a result of human activity, how do we even begin to debate climate 
policies? If we don’t accept the basic, demonstrated truth of the existence of a slave system centered 
on people of African descent and the, yes, fact of a civil war fought in the 1860s over its 
continuation, how can any serious conversation – or even serious fights – about race in this country 
be conducted? Much as it might sound clever or sophisticated to say that the pursuit of truth is 
completely and totally outside the concerns of democracy, it also seems obvious that without some 
baseline of collectively established, de facto facts, we enter the realm of pure power politics. What 
should worry us is how hard a time we are having at the moment coming up with just that form of 
truth. We are already seeing the social and political consequences. This forum, overall, is a deeply 
thought-provoking series of reflections on what that might or should mean, and I’m grateful to all of 
these authors for it.     
Sophia Rosenfeld 
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